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O impacto das crises bancárias sistémicas tem efeitos severos na economia
— tão severos ao ponto de por vezes não se observar sinais de recuperação.
Será que este impacto afeta o sector da educação? Em prinćıpio, durante
uma recessão existem fatores que apontam para um aumento nas matŕıculas
terciárias e outros que apontam para o contrário. Tanto quanto sabemos, não
existem estudos que usam dados em painéis que investiguem o efeito médio
de crises bancárias nas matŕıculas terciárias. A ambição deste estudo passa
por investigar o efeito de crises bancárias sistémicas nas matŕıculas terciárias
num painel de 80 páıses entre o peŕıodo de 1980 e 2017. A metodologia
adotada foi as projeções locais de Jordà (2005). Os resultados demonstram
um efeito nulo, ou seja, as matŕıculas terciárias parecem ”sobreviver”a um
choque de grande magnitude. Como o ńıvel de rendimento de um páıs é um
fator que pode influenciar as matŕıculas terciárias, complementámos a nossa
análise com a separação por ńıveis de rendimento i.e. páıses de baixo-, meio-,
e alto-rendimento. Nos páıses de baixo-rendimento um choque de uma crise
bancária provoca uma diminuição nas matŕıculas terciárias. As conclusões a




The impact of systemic banking crises has severe effects on the economy
— so severe that sometimes the economy shows no signs of recovery. Does
this impact reach the higher education sector? In principle, during a recession
there are factors that point to an increase of tertiary enrollments and others
that point in the opposite direction. To the best of our knowledge, there
are no studies using panel data that estimate the effect of banking crises on
tertiary enrollment. The objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of
systemic banking crisis on tertiary enrollments in a large panel of 80 countries
between 1980 and 2017. The methodology adopted was local projections by
Jordà (2005). The results show a null effect meaning that tertiary enrollment
”survives” to a shock of great magnitude. As income level is a factor that
may influence tertiary enrollments, we complemented our analysis by looking
at different income level groups i.e. low-, middle- , and high-income countries.
We find that in low-income countries a banking crisis shock leads to a decrease
of tertiary enrollments. Our findings contribute to improve our understanding
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In the last decades, education has increasingly been seen as an important, if not
critical, factor for economic development; this has led, accordingly, to a greater
propensity for public authorities, private corporations, and households to invest in
the formation of human capital. Since the labor market has become progressively
knowledge-based, the demand of high skills has been growing — in the OECD
countries, for example, 35% of the population in the 25-34 age group held a tertiary
degree in 2008; in 2018 that percentage was of 44%. The benefits of a higher
education are often linked to higher salaries, lower expectation of unemployment —
for example, according to OECD (2019) the employment rate is 9 percentage points
higher for individuals with tertiary education compared with the adults with upper
secondary education only —, more financial stability, personal development, inter
alia.
During a banking crisis, households may be negatively affected through multiple
channels. For instance, a direct impact of banking crises on households may operate
through a reduction in wealth if losses are imposed on bank depositors. Brown
(2013) studies the impact on households of recent banking crises in Europe and
Central Asia and finds that the labor market tends to be the channel that, indirectly,
affects individuals the most. Adjustments in the public sector and public policies are
also channels through which banking crises may impact households (in particular if
these coincide with sovereign debt crises).
Indeed, a macroeconomic negative shock can in principle affect the education
sector, leading to changes in education institutions e.g. reductions in the number of
maximum allowed enrollments, less research funding, dismissing staff, etc. Likewise,
families may suffer a decrease in their wealth due to e.g. wage cuts, increased
unemployment, and a decrease on the returns of their investments. However, it is
generally thought that economic shocks can have both negative and positive effects
on school enrollments — on the one hand, a decrease in family income may lead
in many cases to the impossibility of paying tuition fees and other costs; yet, on
the other hand, as unemployment increases, many individuals may have extra time
and availability, and may wish to invest in the development of new competencies to
become more high-skilled.
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In fact, the existing literature provides mixed results. Mehrotra (1998), for exam-
ple, shows that in Thailand a reduction in the household income generates a shift
from private to public schools in well-to-do families, while in the poorest families
children dropped out of school. Varghese (2020) provides an overview on the impact
of the Asian 1997 crisis1 on higher education. In Indonesia the growth of enrollments
declined in both public and private universities. However, in Malaysia there was an
increase in higher education enrollment during the crisis period; the same happened,
to a limited extent, in Singapore2.
This paper contributes to the clarification of the effect of macroeconomic shocks on
higher education enrollment by analyzing the specific case of systemic banking crises,
which are relatively rare events with large and long-lasting economic effects. The
rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses briefly the definition,
causes, and effects of banking crises. Section 3 discusses the benefits of a higher
education degree and what economic conditions may affect tertiary enrollments.
Section 4 describes the Local Projections methodology adopted in this investigation
and the data we use. Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 concludes.
1That spread to some countries in East Asia — Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and later Korea
2The increase in student enrollment was justified by the fall in the currency, especially in
Malaysia. The reasons are two-folded: i)it became too expensive to live abroad so many national
students returned to study in national universities and ii)Malaysia became attractive to foreigners
because of the cheaper lifestyle.
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2 Banking Crises
2.1 Definition and causes
There is no universal definition of systemic banking crises and in this paper we
will adopt the one from Laeven and Valencia (2018). This is usually used as a
standard reference on how to identify a banking crisis in the literature. According
to these authors, a systemic banking crisis must meet two conditions — 1) when
the banking system reveals considerable signs of distress and 2) significant banking
policy interventions in response to the distress of the first condition. There can be an
exception in this definition — banking crises can only meet the first condition when
the losses are very severe, more precisely if (i) a country’s banking system exhibits
significant losses resulting in a share of nonperforming loans above 20 percent of total
loans or bank closures of at least 20 percent of banking system assets or (ii) fiscal
restructuring costs of the banking sector are sufficiently high, exceeding 5 percent of
GDP (Laeven and Valencia (2018), p.5).
There are other well-known papers that provide different definitions of banking
crises. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) define a banking crisis as: 1) a run to the
banks that leads to closing, merger or acquisition by the public sector of one or
more financial institutions; 2) in the case of the non-occurrence of the events in
1), the closing, merger, acquisition or governmental assistance on a large scale of
an important financial institution. The reason behind the adoption of the Laeven
and Valencia (2018) definition lies essentially on its objectivity in comparison with
other classifications, which leads to a lower probability of including minor episodes
of financial distress i.e. non-systemic events. The objectivity of Laeven and Valencia
(2018) is due to the fact that significance is defined in a quantitative perspective, for
example concerning the interpretation of what are significant policy interventions.
It is necessary that at least three of the following measures occur: 1) deposit freezes
and/or bank holidays; 2) significant bank nationalizations; 3) bank restructuring
fiscal costs (at least 3 percent of GDP); 4) extensive liquidity support (at least 5
percent of deposits and liabilities to nonresidents); 5) significant guarantees put in
place; and 6) significant asset purchases (at least 5 percent of GDP); (Laeven and
Valencia (2018), p.5).
The solid functioning of the bank system is clearly fundamental for the economy.
Banks provide financial services, more specifically deposits (banks’ liabilities) and
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credit (assets), to consumers and businesses. In this way, the insolvency of a bank
comes from the fact that the value of the assets falls short of the value of the
liabilities e.g. when loan losses (due to the fact of borrowers become unable to pay
them) are superior to the capital and reserves of a bank. Since banking crises are
commonly associated with the banking system encountering loan losses in excess of
its capital, a question arises — what can provoke banking distress? Calomiris (2010)
gives an understanding of the two distinct phenomena associated with banking system
distress: exogenous shocks that produce insolvency, and depositor withdrawals during
‘panics’ (Calomiris (2010), p.17).
Throughout history there has been multiple banking crises. Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009b) count 268 banking crises between 1800 and 2008 in more than 70 countries,
whereas Laeven and Valencia (2018) identify 151 systemic banking crises during
the period of 1970 until 2017 in 165 countries. The literature has identified some
commonalities from the analysis of these events — many of them consist of an un-
avoidable burst of some form of asset bubble followed by government attempts to
bring economic stability. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) find that banking crises are
usually associated to a precedent period of credit booms or asset price bubbles con-
nected to the fact that banks were exposed to a range of risks like credit, liquidity,
and interest rate risk. Honohan (2000) identifies several factors that can lead to
the onset of a banking crisis: macroeconomic circumstances, poor microeconomic
management, and crises that are endemic to a government-permeated banking sys-
tem3. In addition, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) suggest that crises are
normally associated with a poor macroeconomic environment (low growth and a
high inflation) and also find a positive association between high real interest rates
and the occurrence of systemic banking crises.
2.2 Economic effects
By examining a sample of countries that have experienced banking crises, Lind-
gren et al. (1996) note that real GDP growth and economic efficiency4 decreased.
Bordo et al. (2001) estimates a loss of 6% of GDP associated to banking crises in
the last quarter of the 20th century. Teulings and Zubanov (2014) investigate the
3There are countries where the banking system is assured by the financing of government e.g.
by direct lending and/or changing the taxes.
4In this context the authors consider that economic efficiency is the output-to-capital ratio,
calculated as GDP ate 1987 prices divided by capital stock at 1987 prices (Lindgren et al. (1996),
p.83).
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effect of banking crises on GDP on 99 countries between 1974 and 2001 with Jordà
(2005) methodology. The authors find that an average banking crisis generates ap-
proximately a 10% loss on GDP showing little sign of recovery. They also suggest
that banking crises are more critical for African countries. Reinhart and Rogoff
(2014) investigate the change of real per capita GDP in a sample of 100 systemic
banking crises and conclude that, on average, it takes about eight years to reach
the pre-crisis level of income (the median is about 6.5 years). Cerra and Saxena
(2008) use a panel data of 190 countries and establish that banking crises have a
considerable negative effect on GDP that last at least 10 years. The results of this
paper were broken down by region and income level — in all groups it was verified
an output loss of more than 6%, except on Latin America and lower-middle income
countries where the loss was less severe.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) examine the effects of systemic banking crises ex-
cluding emerging market countries from their sample. They show that systemic
banking crises have severe and lasting effects — unemployment rises and housing
price declines extend out for five and six years, respectively (Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009a), p.471). More specifically for unemployment losses, Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009a) estimate a 7 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. Dijk
et al. (2020) investigate the consequences of banking crises on unemployment by
age groups. Their sample includes 38 developed countries and 41 banking crises
between 1990 and 2014. They conclude that unemployment rises in the beginning
of banking crises and continues to increase in the next five years for all age groups
except 65+. A positive aspect is that unemployment recovers in the longer run —
however, even 10 years after a crisis, unemployment does not meet pre-crisis levels.
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3 The links between economic conditions and higher
education
3.1 The benefits of education
At a general level, the economic benefits of education are usually associated to
a decrease in unemployment, an upgrade in human capital in the long run, and to
a decline in the poverty levels. A variety of variables have been used to measure
education — Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992) and Levine and Renelt (1992)
made use of schools enrollments, Romer (1990) and Durlauf and Johnson (1995)
investigated the change on education by considering adult literacy rate, Krueger and
Lindahl (2001) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) the average years of schooling,
Baldacci et al. (2008) considered education spending, Hanushek and Kim (1995),
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) collected data
on cognitive skills in mathematics and science. Although these authors found a
positive relation between economic growth and education, there were studies, as
Bils and Klenow (2000), that found a poor link between them and other studies like
Pritchett (2001) that found no association.
According to most of the literature, the benefits of tertiary education for individ-
uals appear to be clear and observable. That is, there is an association of higher
education to better employment opportunities and higher earnings. Strauss and
Maisonneuve (2007) present a study for 21 OECD countries and find that in 2001
the gross hourly wage premium after the completion of tertiary education is 55%,
translating into a premium of approximately 11% per year5. Also, according to
a more recent OECD (2019) report, in the OECD economies adults6 with a ter-
tiary degree earn on average 57% more in comparison with the individuals that only
completed an upper secondary education.
Due to the benefits associated to a tertiary education, it is possible to observe
a growth trend on tertiary enrollments over the years — for Chapman and Chien
(2014) show that tertiary enrollments have been growing across Asia in the last two
decades. According to OECD (2019) in 2017 for OCDE countries experienced the
largest share of young adults attaining a bachelor’s programmes (24%). Kimenyi
5The lowest wage premium per annum is 6% (in Spain and Greece) and the highest is 14-18%
(in the most of the Anglo-Saxon countries, Portugal and Hungary).
6Between 25 and 64 years old.
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(2011) finds that higher education is a necessity for economic development. The
author also adds that in developing countries, specially in Africa, higher education
has only recently been seen as a priority. Bloom et al. (2014) investigated the
impact of tertiary enrollment rates in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1975 and 2010.
The authors conclude that there are both public and private channels through which
higher education may yield economic development e.g. research and development
or productivity improvements respectively.
3.2 Education during economic recession
It is interesting to observe the behavior of higher education during adverse situ-
ations i.e. if there is an effect on tertiary education enrollments during periods of
economic recession and, in particular, of banking crises, as these financial-economic
shocks typically lead to substantial GDP losses and are associated to slow recoveries
(see the discussion above in section 2.2). On the one side, people could be motivated
to enroll in college due to the lack of work. On the other side, they might not be
able to fulfill that personal objective, as the relative cost of pursuing a degree may
increase as their personal wealth decreases. To the best of our knowledge, there are
no studies using multi-country panel data to estimate the average effect of banking
crises on tertiary enrollment.
Brown and Hoxby (2014) studied the effect of the Great Recession on the enroll-
ment rates of colleges in the United States by following the human capital frame-
work7. The authors concluded that, while families experienced a decrease in their
income, college’s enrollments grew, especially in the states that were most affected
by the recession8. Bell and Blanchflower (2011) concluded that enrollment increased
mostly among 16-24 year-olds by cause of the lack of employment. Skrbinjek et al.
(2018) studied the impact of the economic crisis during 2008 and 2012 in 30 coun-
tries using cluster analysis method. The authors used five variables (GDP per capita,
real GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, fiscal surplus/deficit and gross debt) to
7Relying on Becker (1964), the author assumes that college enrollment is explained by family
background, income and home ownership and unemployment.
8To separate the most affected states from the less affected by the Great Recession, the au-
thors consider two factors: the unemployment rate (the most affected states were those where
the unemployment rate grew 6.5 percentage points or more) and home values (more precisely the
Conventional Mortgage House Price Index (CMHPI) — if a state had more than 80 points then it
was considered as an severely affected state). The states that were more affected were: Alabama,
Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New
Jersey, Rhode Island.
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separate the countries in two groups and concluded that in the economically less
affected countries demand for higher education was higher.
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4 Empirical methodology and data
4.1 Empirical methodology
The aim of this paper is to study the impact of banking crises on tertiary enroll-
ments (% gross) in a sample of 80 countries between 1980 and 2017. The choice of
countries, period of analysis, and control variables were dependent on data availabil-
ity9. The countries included in this study are listed in the Appendix. We estimate
impulse response functions of enrollment to banking crises using local projections
methods (Jordà (2005)). This method has been used to study the macroeconomic
effects on banking crises e.g. Jordà et al. (2013), Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012),
and da Rocha and Solomou (2015). Local projections are estimated with standard
regression models. They are robust to misspecification, as the projections are local
to each forecast horizon. When estimating cumulative impulse responses for panel
data the general equation for country i, year t, lags s, and forecast horizon h is the
following:
yi,t+h − yi,t−1 = αhi + ηht + δhDi,t + λhXi,t−s + uhi,t+h (1)
where the dependent variable is yi,t+h − yi,t−1 (since y is a ratio). The dummy
variable Di,t equals 1 if the banking crisis starts in the i-th country and in year t, and
0 otherwise. The vector Xi,t contains the lags of the dependent variable, the lags
of the explanatory variable, the set of control variables — currency crises, sovereign
debt crises, log of GDP per capita, unemployment rate, expenditure on education
(% GDP), domestic credit to private sector (% GDP), public Expense (% GDP),
central government debt total (% of GDP), and a measure of the democracy level
of each country — and, their respective lags10. We control for country and year
fixed effects using αhi and η
h
t respectively. We restraint our forecast horizon to a
maximum h of 6 i.e. the horizon of the analysis corresponds to half a decade.
9We started by removing countries with a population inferior to one million. In addition,
we excluded the countries that had less than 26 observations for tertiary enrollments — this
corresponds to two thirds of observations for the period of 1980-2017




Systemic banking crises do not have a unique definition and therefore in this paper
we adopt the classification of Laeven and Valencia (2018). These authors identify
151 systemic banking crises in 165 countries. Table A1 in the Appendix contains
the dates of systemic banking crises between 1970 and 2017 for the 80 countries
in study. Other databases of systemic banking crises, as for example Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009b), were not taken into consideration in this paper as they include many
minor events i.e. non-systematic banking crises.
Between 1970 and 2017, for the 80 countries in this study we count 91 systemic
banking crises. The year with most occurrences (18) was in 2008 i.e. at the start
of the Great Recession and mainly on European countries. However, the decade
with more crises was the 90s with 37 crises — some occurred in former-communist
countries11. In 1995, 1997, and 1998 are the years with a higher frequency of events.
Only two banking crises occurred after 2010 — Ukraine and Moldova, both in 2014.
Ukraine and Argentina had three and four banking crises respectively between 1970
and 2017, while 54 countries had only one banking crisis, 15 countries had two, and
only 9 countries had no banking crises.
4.2.2 Tertiary enrollments (% gross)
Higher education is defined as post-secondary education which includes university,
training schools, and other post-secondary institutions. Gross tertiary enrollment
ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age
group that officially corresponds to tertiary education. This variable was sourced
from World Bank (2019) for the period of 1980-2017. In order to compare results,
we also collected secondary enrollments (% gross) from World Bank (2019) for the
same period and countries.
As we can see in Figure 1, there is a clear growth trend in tertiary enrollments
over the years. Figure 1 also shows tertiary enrollments by income level — countries
with higher incomes have the higher tertiary enrollments ratio too. In 1980 the
11To some extent this may capture the shock of the collapse of the planned production system
in the first half of the decade, going beyond what would be a simple banking crises — for more
detail see da Rocha (2015) and Campos and Coricelli (2002).
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Figure 1: Tertiary enrollments (% gross) by income level
Note: The sample only includes the 80 countries in our study. Author’s calculations
using World Bank (2019) and World Bank Analytical Classifications (2020).
country with the highest enrollment was the United States with 53,6 followed by
the Russian Federation with 45,2; the lowest ratio was that of Mozambique with
0,07. In 2017, the countries with the highest enrollments ratios were Greece (136,6)
and next South Korea (94,4); the lowest was Mali, with a ratio of 4,5.
4.2.3 Control Variables
In section 4.1. we define a set of control variables in order to attenuate the
possible endogeneity of banking crises. The inclusion of control variables increases
the probability of estimating a casual effect since we try to avoid the occurrence
of omitted variable bias. Indeed, most of the of the control variables chosen in
this study may have an effect on tertiary enrollments and increase or decrease the
probability of the occurrence of a banking crisis. We start by considering currency12
and sovereign debt crises. The dates of these crises are also from Laeven and Valencia
(2018)13 — see Table A1 for the 80 countries considered in this paper: 99 currency
12Currency crisis are defined as a ’sharp’ nominal depreciation of the currency vis-a-vis the U.S.
dollar. We consider two thresholds for a depreciation to meet this definition: i) a year-on-year
depreciation of at least 30 percent; and ii) of at least 10 percentage points higher than the rate of
depreciation observed in the year before. (Laeven and Valencia (2018), p.9).
13During the period of 1970 and 2017, Laeven and Valencia (2018) identify 326 currency crises
and 74 sovereign crises in 165 countries
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crises and 31 sovereign debt crises. Banking and sovereign debt crises sometimes
have a common start (see Figure 2), with spillovers from the banking system to
the public sector and/or vice versa. Regarding the co-occurrence of banking and
currency crises, this is usually associated to the possible negative effects of the sharp
depreciation of the currency on banks.
Figure 2: Banking, currency and sovereign debt crises
Note: The sample only includes the 80 countries in study. Source: Laeven and Valencia
(2018).
The choice of control variables reflects the discussion in Section 2 and data avail-
ability. There are many factors that may influence individuals to pursue a higher
education degree. We consider more control variables including unemployment rate
and GDP per capita (data from World Bank (2019)). In addition, we consider as
control variables the government expenditure on education (% of GDP), domestic
credit to private sector (% of GDP), public expense (% GDP) (data from World
Bank Indicators), central government debt total (% of GDP) (data from Inter-
national Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund (2019)) and polity2 (from
Marshall (2020)). If domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) is high, then this
indicates that a financial shock (as a banking crisis) tends to propagate at a fast
pace and with higher force in the economy. The public expense indicates the weight
of a government in the economy and the central government debt helps to perceive
the amount of operational leverage that a government has in the event of macroe-
conomic shock. Finally, polity2 captures the democracy level of a country. The
indicator varies between 10 (representing a strong democracy) and -10 (meaning a
strong autocracy).
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Table 1 Summary statistics of the dependent and control variables.
Variables Observations Average Min Max Std. Deviation Median
Tertiary
Enrollments
2669 31,31 0,07 136,60 25,20 25,79
(% gross)
Currency crises 3002 0,03 0 1 0,16 0
(1 in case of occurrence
0 otherwise)
Sovereign debt crises 3002 0,01 0 1 0,10 0
(1 in case of occurrence
0 otherwise)
Unemployment 1947 8,25 0,05 38,80 5,85 7,54
(% of total labor force)




1664 4,45 0,87 13,22 1,58 4,49
(% of gov. expenditure)
Domestic Credit
to private sector
2343 47,73 0,19 206,67 41,85 33,41
(% GDP)
Public expense 1747 28,41 7,59 79,14 11,43 28,55
(% GDP)
Central Gov. Debt 2324 53,78 1,27 302,19 36,41 45,92
(% GDP)
Polity2 2876 3,34 -10 10 6,81 6




In this section, we present a set of local projections results based on equation 1 —
we estimate impulse response functions (IRFs) with no lags, lag=1 and lags=2 (of
the dependent, explanatory, and control variables) and, in addition, regressions with
different sets of control variables; we also estimate IRFs without control variables
as a way to maximize the number of available observations. The study considers a
horizon window of half a decade.
The first set of analysis on Table 2 examines the impact of banking crises on ter-
tiary enrollment (% gross) excluding control variables. Even though the estimate on
banking crises is not statistically significant, we can observe that the points estimate
are mostly positive. As we observe in Figure 3, the confidence bands show a large
uncertainty in the effect of the shock. This is in line with the discussion above about
the ambiguity of the effect of a banking crisis shock on tertiary enrollments. There
may be effects of opposite sign pointing to a null net effect — on average, tertiary
enrollment ”survives” to macroeconomic shocks of great magnitude. However, in
the specification of lags=2 we find some evidence of a positive effect i.e. if there
are effects of opposite signs then the positive one seems to carry more weight. The
same conclusion can be taken when examining Figure 4 and Table A3 (available in
the Appendix) where, in order to keep a large number of observations, the control
variables are log of GDP per capita, polity2 and, currency and sovereign debt crises.
Figure 3: Impulse response function on tertiary education enrollment with no
control variables
Note: Control variables excluded. Confidence bands of 95%. The first column is no lags,
the second is lag=1 and the third one is lags=2. The sample includes 80 countries and
2669 observations.
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Table 2 Impulse response function with no control variables.
































































Note: The estimations are based on Equation 1. No control variables are included. Country-
based cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes 80 countries.
Figure 4: Impulse response function on tertiary enrollment with GDPpc, polity2,
currency crises and sovereign debt crises as control variables
Note: Confidence bands of 95%. The first column is no lags, the second is lag = 1 and
the third one is lags = 2. The sample includes 78 countries and 2430 observations.
In Figure 5, when the sample includes all of the control variables, we can observe
that the confidence bands show a large uncertainty in the effect of a banking crisis
shock on tertiary enrollments pointing to a zero effect in statistical terms. An
important difference between the first two Figures (Figure 3 and Figure 4) and
Figure 5 lies in the most complete specification — in the IRF that includes all
15
Figure 5: Impulse response function on tertiary education enrollment with all
control variables
Note: All of the control variables mentioned in Section 3 included. Confidence bands of
95%. The first column is no lags, the second is lag=1 and the third one is lags=2. The
sample includes 58 countries and 755 observations.
control variables and two lags (Figure 5) there is not an evidence of a stronger
positive effect.
So far, the results offer compelling evidence for the ambiguity on the effect of
a banking crisis on tertiary enrollments. For comparison purposes, we also extend
our analysis to secondary enrollments (% gross) — see Figure A1 and Figure A2
in the Appendix. The confidence bands indicate a significant uncertainty. We can
conclude that there is no effect of a shock of a banking crisis on the secondary enroll-
ments. These results are not surprising, as in many countries secondary education is
mandatory and, in addition, the costs of attending secondary school is much lower
comparing to attending university.
5.2 Impulse response functions by income level
Our study provides further evidence on the effect of banking crisis shocks on
tertiary enrollments. We estimate IRFs for different income level countries. We
considered three distinct groups — low-, middle-, and high-income economies (see
list in Table A2 in the Appendix14). It is interesting to note that there is a clear
distinction between the shape of the different impulse responses. In the group of
high- and middle-income countries, Figure 6 and Figure 7 respectively, we verify
the zero effect mentioned above i.e. the confidence bands express a considerable
uncertainty about the impulse responses conducting the conclusion to a zero effect
in statistical terms. However, in the high-income economies, in the specification of
lags=2, the IRF shows some evidence of a positive effect of a banking crises shock
14The classification is from the World Bank Analytical Classifications (2020)
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on tertiary enrollments.
Figure 6: Impulse response function on tertiary enrollment excluding control vari-
ables — high-income countries
Note: Confidence bands at 95%. The first column is no lags, the second is lag=1 and
the third one is lags=2. In h = 0 the sample includes 27 countries and 967 observations.
In Figure 8 (low-income economies) the IRFs are significantly negative for most
of the horizons meaning that tertiary enrollments are negatively affected by these
shocks. In order to confirm the low-income IRF result without losing too many
observations, we re-estimate this IRF with the following control variables: log of
GDP per capita, polity2, currency crises, and sovereign debt crises – see Figure 9.
Figure 8 and Figure 9 show that in the low-income countries a banking crisis shock
incites a negative change on tertiary enrollments.
Figure 7: Impulse response function on tertiary enrollment excluding control vari-
ables — middle-income countries
Note: Confidence bands at 95%. The first column is no lags, the second is lag=1 and
the third one is lags=2. The sample includes 40 countries and 1268 observations.
In a general way, a macroeconomic shock affects each family differently — there
may be a critical reduction in the household income, mainly in the poorest families.
In high-income countries there are a bigger state support (e.g. unemployment ben-
efits, scholarships etc) in comparison with low-income economies. This lack of state
support in the low-income countries together with a higher number of poor families
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may justify the decrease on tertiary enrollments. One limitation of our implementa-
tion is the small number of low-income countries so these results should be treated
accordingly.
Figure 8: Impulse response function on tertiary enrollment excluding control vari-
ables — low-income countries
Note: Confidence bands at 95%. The first column is no lags, the second is lag=1 and
the third one is lags=2. The sample includes 13 countries and 399 observations.
Figure 9: Impulse response function on tertiary enrollment with GDPpc, polity2,
currency crises and sovereign debt crises as control variables — low-income countries
Note: Confidence bands at 95%. The first column is no lags, the second is lag=1 and
the third one is lags=2. The sample includes 13 countries and 385 observations.
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6 Conclusions
This work has led us to conclude that on average the effect of banking crises on
tertiary enrollments is essentially zero. The confidence bands highlighted a con-
siderable uncertainty on the impulse responses showing an absence on the effect.
In general, these results suggest that there is no evident effect of a banking crisis
shock on tertiary enrollments. In addition, for comparison purposes, we extended
our research to secondary enrollments where we found that the impact of a systemic
banking crisis has, as expected, a zero effect on secondary school enrollments.
The apparent ambiguity in the correlation between banking crises and tertiary
enrollments can be attributed to the fact that there are aspects that contribute to
a positive relation and others that promote for the opposite. In this way, the zero
effect may be justified by a sum of factors of opposite sign.
This paper extended the analysis for different income level countries. In the
middle- and high-income countries the estimated IRFs, once again, confirmed a
general absence of an effect. However, there is an interesting exception: in the high-
income countries the IRF of lags=2 presents some evidence of a positive relation
between tertiary enrollments and a banking crisis shock. In low-income countries,
banking crises appear to have a negative impact on the tertiary enrollments for at
least half a decade. This result may be the consequence of a critical reduction in
the household income and a small state support.
The average lack of correlation between banking crises and tertiary enrollments
pose a challenge to perceive if there are factors of opposite sign that cancel the effect
or if simply there are an absence on the impact of a banking crisis on the tertiary
enrollments. In addition, it would be useful to develop a more detailed study for
the low- and high-income countries and understand if the contrast between high and
low economies lead to the null effect in the complete sample.
There is a long debate over the most efficient way of aiding the less developed
economies. The low-income countries show a negative effect that could extend for
a longer period of time. These results make a small contribution in the selection




The countries included in this study are the following: Albania, Algeria, Ar-
gentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Arab Republic of Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Greece,
Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Repub-
lic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Madagascar,
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozam-
bique, Nepal, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.
Table A1 Banking, Currency and Sovereign crises dates.
Countries Banking Currency Sovereign
Albania 1994 1997 1990









Belarus 1995 1997, 2009, 2015
Belgium 2008
Benin 1988 1994
Bulgaria 1996 1996 1990
Burkina Faso 1990 1994
Burundi 1994
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Table A1 Banking, Currency and Sovereign crises dates. (cont.)
Countries Banking Currency Sovereign
Cambodia 1971,1992
Cameroon 1987, 1995 1994 1989
Chile 1976, 1981 1972, 1982 1983
China 1998




Egypt, Arab Rep. 1980 1979, 1990, 2016 1984





Greece 2008 1983 2012




Indonesia 1997 1979, 1998 1999
Ireland 2008
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Table A1 Banking, Currency and Sovereign crises dates. (cont.)
Countries Banking Currency Sovereign
Israel 1983 1975, 1980, 1985
Italy 2008 1981
Jordan 1989 1989 1989
Korea, Rep. 1997 1998
Kyrgyz Republic 1995 1997
Lao PDR 1972, 1978, 1986,
1997
Latvia 1995, 2008 1992
Lesotho 1985, 2015
Lithuania 1995 1992
Madagascar 1988 1984, 1994, 2004 1981




Mexico 1981, 1994 1977, 1982, 1995 1982
Moldova 2014 1999 2002
Mongolia 2008 1990, 1997
Morocco 1980 1981 1983
Mozambique 1987 1987, 2015 1984
Nepal 1988 1984, 1992
Netherlands 2008
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Table A1 Banking, Currency and Sovereign crises dates. (cont.)




Peru 1983 1976, 1981, 1988 1978
Philippines 1983, 1997 1983, 1998 1983
Poland 1992 1981
Portugal 2008 1983
Romania 1998 1996 1982
Russian Fed. 1998, 2008 1998, 2014 1998
Slovenia 1992, 2008
Spain 1977, 2008 1983






Tanzania 1987 1985, 1990 1984
Thailand 1983, 1997 1998
Togo 1993 1994 1979
Tunisia 1991
Uganda 1994 1980, 1988 1981
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Table A1 Banking, Currency and Sovereign crises dates. (cont.)
Countries Banking Currency Sovereign
Ukraine 1998, 2008,
2014
1998, 2009, 2014 1998, 2015
United Kingdom 2007
United States 1988, 2007




Vietnam 1997 1972, 1981, 1987 1985
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Egypt, Arab Rep. Lower-middle
El Salvador Lower-middle
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Table A2 Countries by income level (cont.)
Countries Income
Switzerland High














Table A3 Impulse response function with GDPpc, Polity2, Currency Crises and
Sovereign debt crises as control variables.
































































Note: The estimations are based on Equation 1 — the dependent variables is school enrollment
on tertiary education (% gross), the shock is banking crises defined by Laeven and Valencia
(2018) and the control variables are GDPpc, Polity2, Currency crises and Sovereign debt crises.
Country-based cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes 78 countries.
Figure A1: Impulse response function on secondary enrollment excluding control
variables
Note: All control variables excluded. Confidence bands of 95%. The first column is no
lags, the second is lag = 1 and the third one is lag = 2. In h = 0 the sample includes 79
countries and 2487 observations.
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Figure A2: Impulse response function on secondary enrollment including all control
variables
Note: All control variables included. Confidence bands of 95%. The first column is no
lags, the second is lag = 1 and the third one is lag = 2. In h = 0 the sample includes 58
countries and 755 observations.
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Jordà, Ò., Schularick, M., and Taylor, A. M. (2013). When credit bites back. Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 45(s2):3–28.
Kimenyi, M. S. (2011). Contribution of Higher Education to Economic Development:
A Survey of International Evidence. Journal of African Economies, 20:14–49.
Krueger, A. B. and Lindahl, M. (2001). Education for growth: Why and for whom?
Journal of Economic Literature, 39(4):1101–1136.
32
Laeven, L. and Valencia, F. (2018). Systemic banking crises revisited. IMF Working
Papers, 18:1.
Levine, R. and Renelt, D. (1992). A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth
regressions. American Economic Review, 82:942–63.
Lindgren, C., Garcia, G., and Saal, M. (1996). Bank soundness and macroeconomic
policy.
Mankiw, N. G., Romer, D., and Weil, D. N. (1992). A contribution to the empirics
of economic growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2):407–437.
Marshall, Monty G Gurr, T. R. (2020). Polity™ project polity5 political regime
characteristics and transitions, 1800-2018 dataset users’ manual. Data available
on www.systemicpeace.org.
Mehrotra, S. (1998). Mitigating the social impact of the economic crisis: a review
of the royal thai government’s responses. New York: UNICEF (mimeo).
OECD (2019). Education at a Glance 2019.
Pritchett, L. (2001). Where has all the education gone? The World Bank Economic
Review, 15(3):367–391.
Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. (2009a). The aftermath of financial crises. American
Economic Review, 99:466–72.
Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. (2014). Recovery from financial crises: Evidence from
100 episodes. American Economic Review, 104:50–55.
Reinhart, C. M. and Rogoff, K. S. (2009b). This Time Is Different. Princeton
University Press.
Romer, P. M. (1990). Human capital and growth: Theory and evidence. Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 32:251–286.
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